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Abstract
This paper considers the risk premium for one risk when
other background risk is present. In a mean-variance setting, we
examine the conditions under which the risk premium will be
negative. These conditions consider the variance of the
considered risk in relation to the covariance of the considered
risk with the background risk. We consider the cases of both
multiplicative and additive risks. A breakdown of the total risk
premium into several components is established by removing each
source of risk consecutively. The case of mutliplicative risks is
shown to be quite different from the additive-risk case in that
the individual's total willingness-to-pay for the removal of all
risk on a sequential basis does not necessarily equal the
willingness-to-pay for removal of all risk simultaneously.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/additivemultipli1347dohe
-2-
I . Introduction
A recent set of papers ( Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams
(1981), Nachman (1982), Pratt (1982) and Ross (1981)) has
examined measures of risk aversion when initial wealth is
randomly distributed. These papers deal with aversion to one risk
when other risks are present, and their results have already had
some far-reaching consequences for insurance markets as evidenced
by recent papers by Doherty and Schlesinger (1983) and Turnbull
(1983). However, these papers have focused mainly on the local
properties of risk aversion. In this paper, we concern ourselves
with risk aversion for finite discrete risks. In particular, we
examine the nature of risk premiums in a model with multiple
sources of risk. We show that willingness-to-pay for the
sequential removal of risks is identical to willingness-to-pay
for the simultaneous removal of all risk when the multiple risks
are additive or when they are multiplicative but with a zero
covariance. We also examine conditions under which the risk
premium will be negative.
Pratt (1964) demonstrated an equivalence between the sign
and ordering of the Arrow-Pratt measure of local risk aversion
and the sign and ordering of the risk premium payable on any
given risky transaction. A risk averter would pay a positive risk
premium and a more-risk-averse person would pay a higher risk
premium on the same risky transaction. However, this ordering
equivalence need not be preserved when background risk is
present, even if the transaction risk and background risk are
independent, as was demonstrated by Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams
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( 1981-hereafter KRW) . Furthermore, once the independence
assumption is dropped, this sign equivalence need not be
preserved either. KRW showed that risk premium for a risk averte:
could be negative if there is a negative correlation between
sources of risk. However, a positive risk premium is also
possible, even with perfect negative correlation. This is not
surprising once one considers the stochastic relationship betweei
sources of risk in terms of the total-wealth prospect.
In this paper we derive a method for "adding up" risk
premiums (or eguivalently "breaking them down") based on the
stochastic nature of wealth. This derivation is developed via
considering the sequential elimination of sources of risk in two
alternative frameworks. In the first framework (section II)
additive risks are considered, whereas multiplicative risks are
assumed in the second framework (section IV). For each of these
models a simple example is provided which illustrates the "addinc
up" formula and allows for a graphical representation of both
positive and negative risk premiums (sections III and V). The
main results are summarized in section VI.
II. Risk premiums with additive risks
We define the individual's total wealth prospect as Y=w+x
where (w,x) is a random pair taking values in E . The case where
w is nonrandom represents the standard single risk model. The
individual is assumed to be strictly risk averse with preferences
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expressed by the twice dif ferentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function, U(Y), where U'(Y)>0 and U"(Y)<0. We consider
the following three distinct risk premiums:
(i) The total risk premium for removing all risk from the
individual's wealth portfolio, * , which is defined by
(1) EU(w+x) = UtEw+Ex- 71 ).
The symbol E, above, denotes mathematical expectation. For a risk
averter, * is always Dositive.
y * *
(ii) The risk premium of x in the presence of w, u
,
defined by
(2) EU(w+x) = EU(w+Ex-tt ).
Thus, * is the premium one is willing to pay to have x replaced
by its expectation while retaining the riskiness of w. The amount
Ex- * is the certainty equivalent for x in the presence of w,
which we denote by C . The individual is willing to replace x by
any certain amount exceeding C , while maintaining the randomness
in w.
(iii) The conditional risk premium for removing the risk in
w after having paid to remove the riskiness in x. We
denote this risk premium n ._ , defined by
w|C
x
-5-
(3) EU(w+C
x
) = U(Ew+C
x
-tt
w1c ).
Thus, it
i
represents a willingness-to-pay to remove the
w
I
C
x
riskiness in w, given that x has already been replaced by C^.
We note that both * and * ,_ are ordinary Arrow-Pratt risky w l.1
' X
premiums. The former treats w+x as a single random variable
(i.e., a single source of risk) while the latter has only one
source of risk to consider, namely w. However, * x is not the
usual Arrow-Pratt type of risk premium; rather, it is the risk
premium used by KRW and it removes only part of the total risk.
From equations (1), (2) and (3), the following result is
immediate
:
Proposition 1A ; n v
=
^x
+
"wlc '
This result is fairly obvious, saying that the maximum
amount of income an individual would pay to remove all riskiness
in w+x must equal the sum of the amount he would pay to remove
the riskiness in x alone and the amount he would pay to remove
the remaining risk in w after having paid * to remove the risk
in x. However, as we shall see in section IV, this nice
additivity propoerty does not always hold when risks are
multiplicative
.
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Another result that follows straight from the definitions
and from Jensen's inequality is
Proposition 2A : If w and x are independently distributed, tt >0.
"
—
'
*\
When w and x are not independently distributed, it is easy
to see that n might be negative when the correlation is
negative. For example, if x = -w, it is easy to show that tt =0,
* <0 and * . = - tt
x w C x
1 x
We can gain some insight into this situation if we first
consider a case where the riskiness of w and of x is very small.
In a manner similar to Pratt (1964) and Ross (1981), we can take
Taylor expansions of each side of (1). This provides an
apDroximation for tt in terms of the covariance of x and w.^- x
Expanding (1) around Ew+Ex, we obtain the following
a
approximation
:
(4) ( 1/2) Var(w+x)U" = - tt U ' + (1/2) Var(w)U"
where U 1 and U" are evaluated at Ew+Ex. Noting that Var(w+x)
Var(w) + Var(x) + 2 Cov(w,x) and dividing by ( -U ' ) yields
(5) tt
x
= [(1/2) Var(x) + Cov(w,x)] R
where R = -U"/U* is the local measure of absolute risk aversion
evaluated at Ew+Ex.
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Although (5) is an approximation, it indicates that a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for tt to be negative i<
cV
that Cov(w,x) be negative. Indeed, we observe that n <0 if and
only if Cov(w,x) <- (1/2) Var(x).
III. Additive risks: an illustration
In order to gain some geometric intuition, consider an
example where (w,x)=(w ,x, ) or (w, ,x ) with probability 1/2 each,
and where w <w, and x <x. . Thus, w and x have a correlation of
o 1 o 1 '
-1. tt >0 if and only if EU(w+Ex) > EU(w+x). In our case this
reduces to
U(w,+Ex) - U(w,+x ) > U(w +x.) - U(w +Ex)1 lo ol o
or
U(w,+x +(Ex-x )) - U(w,+x ) > U(w +Ex + (x.-Ex)) - U(w +Ex)1 o o 1 o o 1 o
Noting that Ex-x =x.-Ex, one may divide both sides by the same
amount and obtain, under the small risk assumption
U ' (w
l
+ X
o
) > U ' (w +Ex) *
and finally, 2(w..-w ) < x, - xi o l o
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In other words, even with perfect negative correlation, n will be
positive if the spread in w is relatively snail. More generally, it
follows from (5) that II will be positive, assuming small risks with aA
perfect negative correlation, whenever Var(w) < (l/4)Var(x). The
above example is illustrated in figures 1-3.
Th;!- -•' F :•> »fl C - I- "i lir.j^f
In figure 1, w+Ex is preferred to w+x. Consequently, we can
subtract it from each of the w+Ex values to obtain a new
x
prospect, (w +C ) or (w,+C ) each with probability 1/2, which is
indifferent to w+x. Once n is determined, it is easy to
x J
illustrate the "adding-up" formula given by Proposition 1A. To
avoid clutter, this is shown in figure 2, which reproduces some
essentials from figure 1. Both figures 1 and 2 illustrate the
case where tt = . An example where tt <0 is illustrated in figure
X X
3.
IV. Risk premiums with multiplicative risks
It has been shown by Turnbull (1983) that the stronger risk
aversion measure proposed by Ross (1981) is not strong enough to
provide meaningful results when risks are multiplicative rather
than additive. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to investigate
whether the results obtained in section II under the additivity
assumption are preserved under multiplicative risks.
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We redefine the individual's final wealth propsect as
Y=w+zx, where
. w is his nonrandom initial wealth;
. x is a speculative risk faced by the individual, for
example the random market value of a property at risk;
. ze[0,l] is a pure risk, for example, the extent of a
damage threatening the individual's property.
As before, we may define three distinct risk premiums:
i) The total risk premium tt which the individual would b
* y
willing to pay for removing both risks inherent in Y,
defined by
(6) EU(w+zx) = U(w+E(zx) - tt ) .
By Jensen's inequality, n >0 for all strictly concave U.
ii) The risk premium for x in the presence of z, tt , which
is the premium that the individual would be willing to
pay to obtain the expected value of x instead of the
random amount x, while maintaining the randomness of z
It is given by
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(7) EU(w+zx) = EU(w+zEx-tt )X
= EU(C + zEx)
,
x ' '
where C =w- n . In this case C is nonrandom again, butXX X
it is not the certainty equivalent of x, as in section
II.
iii) The condition risk premium * . , which is the amount
' x
that the individual would be willing to pay to
eliminate the pure risk z and replace it by Ez, after
having replaced the risk x by its expected value. It is
given by
8 EU C +zEx = U(C +EzEx - * ,„ ).
x x z C
x
By Jensen's inequality ^ . _ > for all strictly concave U
From these definitions, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1M : tt = tt + tt . + Cov(z,x)
2 X
Thus, when risks are multiplicative, Proposition 1A does not
hold in general: the global risk premium differs from the sum of
the two partial risk premiums. The additivity property of risk
premiums holds only under independence of risks, or under the
somewhat less restrictive assumption of zero correlation. If, for
example, Cov(z,x) < 0, Proposition 1M indicates that the
individual would pay less to remove both risks simultaneously
than to remove them one after the other. Lest we think arbitrage
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opportunities would prevent this from occurring, we must point
out that we do not end up at the same replacement for zx in the
two cases. When the risk is removed all at once, we replace zx
with E(zx). On the other hand, replacing the random variables
sequentially leaves us with (Ez)(Ex). Thus, the amount we are
willing to pay for these replacements is not expected to be the
same. It is trivial to show that the total amount we would pay t
remove the risks sequentially does not depend upon the order of
their removal.
As before, we are interested in the conditions under which
TT <0.
x
Proposition 2M ; If x and z are independently distributed,
it >0.
x
Proof : Straightforward from Jensen's inequality Q.E.D
If x and z are not independently distributed, Proposition 2
will clearly not hold in all cases. An example is provided in th
illustration below. We also note that the relationship between *
and tt is not as simple as it was in section II. In some cases,
the global risk premium * may be smaller than the partial risk
premium » . From Proposition 1M, we see that this will occur
whenever Cov(z,x)<-tt
z |C V
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V. Multiplicative risks: an illustration
Using the model presented in the preceding section, we
Drovide here a two-state illustration. Let xe { x ,x..}, x,>x , and
o ± 1 o
let ze{O f l) / i.e. full loss or no damage at all. Moreover assume
perfect positive correlation, i.e. x=x, when z=l and x=x whenr r 1 o
z = 0. We thus have:
Y =
w + x.
w
From (7), the condition for n <0 is
EU(w+zx) > EU(w+zEx).
Using the assumptions above, this reduces to x >Ex, which is
always satisfied. Thus n is negative under perfect positive
correlation. By a similar argument, it may be shown that * is
necessarily positive under perfect negative correlation.
These results are easily explained. Under positive
correlation, the damage is high when the market value of the
property is low. The individual is not prepared to pay much to
remove the volatility in x because he would lose on positive
deviations without earning something on negative deviations.
Hence tt is low and may even be negative. Inversely, under
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negative correlation, the individual is prepared to pay a high v^
because this would remove the negative deviations on x, without
having to incur a loss on positive deviations.
VI. Concluding remarks
We have presented some results on risk premiums with
multiple sources of risks by considering first an additive risk
framework and then a multiplicative risk framework. In the first
case we find that the risk premium for the removal of all risks
equals the sum of the risk premium for removing one risk while
retaining the other and the risk premium for removing the
remaining risk after having paid the risk premium to remove the
first risk. This nice relationship does not hold any longer whe:
risks are multiplicative. The covariance between the risks is
then also a component of the total risk premium. In addition, we
show that the risk premium for removing one risk while retaining
the other may be negative, both in the additive and
multiplicative risk frameworks. Negative correlation is a
necessary condition for this result to hold when risks are small
additive. Inversely, a simple illustration shows that the result
is associated with positive correlation under multiplicative
risks
.
Most previous work concerns itself with extending canonical
results concerning an individual being "more risk averse" to
case of multiple sources of risk. For example, Pratt (1982)
considers tt(x|w), defined by EU ( w+x) =U ( w+Ex- tt ( x | w) ) where w is
nonrandom realization of w. Pratt then shows that the usual
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measure of risk aversion, -U' (Y)/U"(Y) is not sufficient to
guarantee that "more risk averse" implies: " tt is larger "--even
A
when w and x are independent. Pratt goes on to show that
additional assumptions concerning tt(x|w) are sufficient to yield
the desired conclusions.
The focus of this paper is not on comparing different
individuals exposed to the same risky prospect. We focus on the
nature of the risk; in particular, on the relationship between
the sources of risk. The Arrow-Pratt measure of local risk
aversion works well for what it is designed to do; namely, place
a subjective value on the risk inherent in the total-wealth
prospect. When considering the removal of only one of many
sources of risk, it is not surprising that we do not necessarily
preserve the sign and ordering equivalence between the risk
Dremium and the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion.
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utilitv
EU(w+Ex) -
EU(w+x)
w +C
o x
Figure 1
utility
EU(w+x)
wealth
Figure 2
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utility
EU(w + x)
W +Ex w +C w n +x
O O X 1 o
w, +Ex w, +C
1 1 x
wealth
Figure 3
-17-
Footnotes
1. Although we only consider two risky sources, the results are
extendable to three or more sources of risk in a straight-
forward, but tedious, manner. It is also possible to examine the
distribution of y compared with the convolution of the marginal
distributions of x and w to derive stochastic dominance rules for
additive risk premiums. See Doherty and Schlesinger (1986).
2. Note that we have approximated the left-hand side (LHS) of equa-
tion (1) with a first-order expansion, while we used a second-order
expansion for the right-hand side (RHS). This yields errors of
2
asymptotic orders 0(tt ) and o[Var(x)] respectively. Thus, a higher-
order expansion of the LHS would not increase the accuracy of the
approximation for small Var(x). See Pratt (1964) and Ross (1981)
for a further discussion.
D/202
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